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In Search of an Effective Trade Policy
for the Film Industry: Lessons from Korea*
Jimmyn PARC** & Patrick MESSERLIN***
This article explores which trade-related policies are effective – that is both economically and
culturally sound – to promote the film industry that has recently been highlighted more due to its
prominent political, economic and cultural dimensions. By examining the trade-related policies of
nine major countries for their film industries over the last forty years, several important findings
are extracted which contribute towards a more pragmatic debate on ‘trade and culture’. First,
regulatory barriers such as import or screen quotas should be avoided at all costs since they do not
protect the domestic film industry. Second, tax relief schemes are unreliable because they tend to
offer excessive support to attract foreign film producers. Third, as a choice to be considered,
subsidies should be kept reasonable in size and focus on consistent goals. Fourth, well-designed
trade agreements can contribute greatly to enhance film policies. Finally, once combined, these
results explain to a large extent the remarkable success of the Korean film industry over the last
two decades, which can be a good bench marker for countries that want to enhance their film
industry and to promote their culture.
1 INTRODUCTION
Should cultural products and services be treated differently from other goods and
services? In addressing this question, politically loaded concepts have emerged like
‘cultural exemption’ in the 1992 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)
and ‘cultural exception’ at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations. It has also
made the debate on ‘Trade and Culture’ one of the most controversial issues in
international relations, resulting in the collapse of negotiations on the Multilateral
Investment Agreement in 1998. In recent times, these concepts have morphed into
the slightly less aggressive notion of ‘cultural diversity’ under the aegis of the
UNESCO’s 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity
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of Cultural Expressions (hereafter the Convention).1 However, in the 2010s, this
controversial issue has again been the source of harsh conflict during the negotia-
tions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP).
Throughout the troubled history of trade and culture, the film industry has
maintained a very prominent position as a result of its social, political, and
economic importance. In many countries – even those with a relatively more
open trade regime – there are recurrent requests for strengthening existing protec-
tionist measures or developing new ones for the film industry. This trend continues
even in the era of digitization where consumption happens through multimedia
devices, particularly in emerging markets with huge consumer pools such as China
and India.
As yet most studies have been too narrow in their focus on this difficult
question, therefore a more prudent and pragmatic approach would be to examine
the effectiveness of trade policies in the film industry over the past few decades,
both from an economic and cultural perspective. In this regard, this study seeks to
analyse which trade measures and agreements have achieved their intended eco-
nomic goals while also being supportive of legitimate cultural concerns.
In exploring these issues, this article reveals how the Korean film industry
emerged as a remarkably successful example. It was marginal in terms of admissions
for domestic films as well as its overall market size in the early 1990s, but has
become now larger and more vibrant than even many of the film industries in
Europe, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (hereafter
the UK). This result was achieved following the liberalization of the Korean film
market for which trade agreements made a significant contribution. It also received
fewer subsidies than many other countries. Last but not least, Korea is the only
industrialized country that supports both an open trade regime and the notion of
cultural exception as stipulated by the Convention. All these features make the
Korean film industry a life-size reference for a pragmatic trade and culture debate.
Furthermore, important implications for other countries can be drawn by examin-
ing this particular case.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 explains why the regulatory
barriers on market access have become less prevalent in the nine largest film
markets on which this study focuses: the aforementioned five European countries,
Japan, Korea, Mexico and the United States (hereafter the US). Section 3 examines
the contribution of trade agreements to this remarkable evolution. Section 4
focuses on subsidies and tax relief schemes which are the central instruments of
1 Mira Burri-Nenova, Trade and Culture in International Law: Paths to (Re)conciliation, 44(1) J. World
Trade 49–80 (2010).
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public support to film industries today, and it scrutinizes their pros and cons that
are often overlooked. Section 5 analyses the current limits and potentialities of
trade agreements to deal with subsidies in the film industry. Section 6 connects the
success of the Korean film industry to its policies. The conclusion suggests further
studies to expand the analysis presented in this article.
2 THE DECLINE OF REGULATORY BARRIERS ON MARKET
ACCESS
Regulatory barriers on market access are used to restrict the entry of foreign films
to domestic markets. A few examples include import and screen quotas after the
1920s, dubbing requirements since the 1930s, and quotas on broadcasting foreign
films on TV after the 1960s.2 Although most of these measures have disappeared,
there are still recurrent requests to re-establish them in various countries around
the world. This section explains why these barriers are intrinsically unable to
protect the domestic film industry and then presents a rigorous assessment on the
current status of these barriers.
2.1 THE INTRINSIC INEFFICIENCY OF REGULATORY BARRIERS
Import quotas are designed to restrict the number of foreign films imported.
However, they do not place a limit on the number of moviegoers who go to
watch these films. This then induces companies to import the most successful foreign
films so that they receive the largest earnings. By contrast, the domestic films that are
in competition with these foreign films tend to be of lower quality – this is why
import quotas are imposed in the first instance – hence they generate low earnings.
In short, import quotas create more demand for successful foreign films than low-
quality domestic ones. This creates ‘unfair competition’ in the domestic market and
stands in opposition to what was generally expected to happen when implementing
import quotas. Therefore, granting them is not the solution for promoting a
country’s film industry.
2 Import and screen quotas in the film industry have been prevalent and politically sensitive barriers
since the 1920s. In 1948, GATT Art. IV exempted them from the general prohibition of import
quotas. In 1994, the EU-US fight on TV quotas almost derailed the final conclusion of the Uruguay
Round. See Bill Grantham, Some Big Bourgeois Brothels, Contexts for France’s Culture Wars with
Hollywood. (Luton, UK: University of Luton Press 2003); Today, major countries want to extend
them to digital providers; see for instance, Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of
audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities, Guidance for future work, Interinstitutional
File: 2016/0151 (COD)k (Brussels: Council of the European Union 24 Apr. 2017), p. 8.
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Screen quotas reserve a minimum number of days per year that a domestic
film is shown, but not the number of times it is screened. However, they cannot
guarantee a large audience to go and watch these domestic films. As a result, movie
theatres are induced to manipulate the regulations by all possible means. When the
quality of domestic films is poor, movie theatres will then show foreign films many
times a day as opposed to once or a few times a day for domestic films. By contrast,
when the quality of domestic films is good, movie theatres fill up the minimum
number days with only a few successful domestic films before shifting to foreign
blockbusters. Hence, screen quotas hinder cultural diversity.
The history of the Korean film industry is illustrative of the huge distortions
caused by quotas.3 Before import quotas were abolished in the late 1980s, Korean
companies produced rapidly a number of low-quality domestic films known as
‘quota quickies’ so that they could gain an official license to import a greater
number of successful foreign films. These quota quickies were not popular and did
not generate much earnings, which led to fewer Korean films being produced and
thus fewer foreign films being imported under the import quota regime. As a
result, the size of the Korean film market shrunk significantly throughout the
1970s. The situation continued to deteriorate later under the screen quota regime.
2.2 ASSESSING THE CURRENT LEVEL OF BARRIERS AND MEASURES
Table 1 presents the overall Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) which
estimates the current level of barriers and measures for film industries around the
world (column 1).4 These indexes highlight an interesting point: the Korean and
Japanese film industries are the most open among the selected countries. That
noted, this article divides STRI into three main components which differ funda-
mentally by the type of international negotiations and agreements they call for: the
regulatory barriers on market access (column 2), measures on movements of capital
and labour (column 3), and other barriers (column 4).
3 For a detailed analysis, see Jimmyn Parc, An Eclectic Approach to Enhancing the Competitive Advantage of
Nations: Analyzing the Success Factors of East Asian Economies with a Focus on the Development of South
Korea, PhD Thesis, Seoul National University, Université de Paris IV (2014); see also Jimmyn Parc, The
Effects of Protection in Cultural Industries: The Case of the Korean Film Policies, 23(5) Int’l J. Cultural Pol’y
618–633 (2017).
4 The STRI database identifies measures that can restrict trade in twenty-two services sectors for forty-
five countries. Out of a total eighty-one potentially restrictive measures in the film industry, forty eight
are found restrictive in at least one of the nine countries covered by this study. The STRI takes values
between zero and one, one being the most restrictive. See Massimo Geloso-Grosso, Iza Lejárraga,
Hildegunn Nordås, Frederic Gonzales, Sébastien Miroudot, Asaki Ueno & Dorothée Rouzet, Services
Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI): Construction, Architecture and Engineering Services (Paris: OECD 2015).
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Table 1 Level of the Regulatory Barriers and Measures (Selected Countries, 2017)
(1)
Barriers and Measures in the Film Industry [(2) + (3) + (4)]
Market Access
(2) (3)
Measures on Inputs [(3a) + (3b)] Others
(4)Capital (3a) Labour (3b)
France
(%)
0.228 0.054 0.071 0.018 0.053 0.103
100.00 23.68 31.14 7.89 23.25 45.18
Germany
(%)
0.173 0.015 0.092 0.025 0.067 0.066
100.00 8.67 53.18 14.45 38.73 38.15
Italya
(%)
0.273 0.029 0.114 0.047 0.067 0.130
100.00 10.62 41.76 17.22 24.54 47.62
Japan
(%)
0.105 0.000 0.050 0.015 0.035 0.055
100.00 0.00 47.62 14.29 33.33 52.38
Korea
(%)
0.153 0.044 0.082 0.025 0.057 0.027
100.00 28.76 53.59 16.34 37.25 17.65
Mexico
(%)
0.273 0.040 0.124 0.069 0.055 0.109
100.00 14.65 45.42 25.27 20.15 39.93
Spain
(%)
0.194 0.029 0.075 0.022 0.053 0.090
100.0 14.95 38.66 11.34 27.32 46.39
US
(%)
0.158 0.015 0.092 0.025 0.067 0.051
100.00 9.49 58.23 15.82 42.41 32.28
UK
(%)
0.212 0.015 0.140 0.040 0.100 0.057
100.00 7.08 66.04 18.87 47.17 26.89
Data Source: STRI database. Authors’ calculations.
Regulatory barriers are defined in this study as the tariffs, quotas, and any restric-
tions that limit the access of foreign films to the country’s domestic market. Once
converted into percentages, these barriers represent a small share of a country’s
total STRI (column 2). The exceptions are France, mainly due to dubbing
regulations, and Korea, mostly due to the screen quotas. As trade negotiators are
well accustomed to dealing with such kinds of barriers, reducing or eliminating
them in the case of the film industry can be done in the traditional context of trade
agreements.
AN EFFECTIVE TRADE POLICY FOR THE FILM INDUSTRY 749
There are also measures to limit the entry of capital and/or labour (col-
umns 3a and 3b) that foreign film-makers need for producing films in a host
country. Table 1 shows that the regulatory measures on capital movement
contribute less to the overall indexes than those of labour movement, except
for Mexico. As these measures are generally enforced in all sectors of the
country, reducing or eliminating them requires the negotiation of a much
more complex framework – that is, an economy-wide agreement covering
movements of production factors. In trade parlance it is often referred to as a
‘deep integration’ agreement.
Finally, there are the other regulatory measures (column 4), such as competi-
tion rules, intellectual property rights, or rules on cross-border data flows. They
reflect the general complexity of the regulatory framework in the selected coun-
tries. Interestingly, they are significant in France, Italy, Spain, and Mexico, but,
much less so in Korea. Even deep integration agreements are unlikely to address
these measures which are generally dealt with in the context of domestic reforms.
3 THE ROLE OF TRADE AGREEMENTS REGARDING BARRIERS
TO MARKET ACCESS
The main role of traditional trade agreements is to eliminate or reduce the barriers
to market access, and to harness them through international commitments. The
existing literature on trade agreements in audiovisual sectors does not suggest that
they have played such a role over the two last decades: commitments – either in
multilateral or bilateral agreements – are rather limited in both scope and legally
binding terms.5 By contrast, this study highlights a more positive assessment based
on three specific trade agreements since the 1980s where the services sectors began
to be involved in international trade negotiations. One agreement involves Mexico
and the US and two others involve Korea and the US among the selected
5 For multilateral agreements, see the following references; Yvan Bernier, The Recent Free Trade
Agreements of the United States as Illustration of Their New Strategy Regarding the Audiovisual Sector,
Seoul Conference 2004 Ministère de la Culture, Québec, Canada, http://www.diversite-culturelle.
qc.ca/index.php?id=133&L=1; Caroline Pauwels & Jan Loisen, The WTO and the Audiovisual Sector,
18(3) Eur. J. Comm. 291–313 (2003); Martin Roy, Juan Marchetti & Hoe Lim, Services Liberalization
in the New Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS?, World
Trade Organization. Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-07 (Geneva: World Trade Organization Sept.
2006). For bilateral agreement, see the following references; Kenny Chase, Audiovisual Goods and
Services in Preferential Trade Agreements, in Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential
Trade Agreements (Andreas Dur & Manfred Elsig eds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015);
Gilbert Gagné, The Trade and Culture Debate, Evidence from U.S. Trade Agreements (Lanham: Lexington
Books 2016); Roy Martin, Beyond the Main Screen: Audiovisual Services in PTAs, in Opening Markets for
Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations, World Trade Organization
(Juan Marchetti & Martin Roy eds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008).
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countries.6 By examining the different responses of Mexico and Korea to trade
agreements, valuable lessons can be provided on their impact.
The role of the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on
the liberalization of the Mexican film industry was severely constrained by the
1988 CUSFTA. This agreement grants a broad ‘cultural exemption’ to
Canada – notably the right to keep TV quotas for transmitting audiovisual works
with ‘certified Canadian content’.7 NAFTA Chapter 21 on exceptions states that
‘the rights and obligations between Canada and any other Party with respect to
such measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada and the
US’ – hence Canada’s cultural exemption was extended to the agreement between
Canada and Mexico.8 However, in the Mexico-US component of NAFTA, the
Mexican government agreed to put a cap of 30% on its screen quota.9
This Mexican commitment can be considered to have little economic value
because its film industry has not been able to meet such a target since the 1970s.10
But, this view ignores the ‘binding’ value of the Mexican commitment – an
important concept from a trade law perspective. This means that, for whatever
reason if the Mexican government wants to impose a higher screen quota in the
future, it cannot do so without the risk of having to compensate the US. Indeed,
the binding level chosen in NAFTA has a special meaning in the Mexican context.
In 1992, after a lengthy debate, Mexico adopted a federal law setting unilaterally a
6 France, Korea, Mexico and Spain still maintain screen quotas. However, MPAA found that the French
screen quota has not posed any problem for MPAA member companies for a long time. See Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA). Trade Barriers to Exports of U.S. Filmed Entertainment
(Washington: Motion Picture Association, Inc. Nov. 1994); The Spanish quota does not suggest a
strong barrier either according to MPAA. See Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA),
Comments Regarding the 2015 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Docket: USTR
2014-0014, Oct. 2014), https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-MPAA-NTE-
Report-Compiled.pdf; This study does not cover the intra-EU agreement known as the 1989
Directive ‘Television without Frontiers’ and its successors.
7 The NAFTA provision on exceptions (Annex 2106) reads: ‘any measure adopted or maintained with
respect to cultural industries, except as specifically provided in Article 302 (Market Access – Tariff
Elimination), and any measure of equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed
under this Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions of the Canada – United States
Free Trade Agreement. The rights and obligations between Canada and any other Party with respect
to such measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada and the United States.’
8 See NAFTA, Ch. 21, Annex 2106. The US decision to accept this exemption was purely political:
President Reagan, a former President of the Screen Actors Guild, was so eager to lay the foundations
of a North American neighbourhood that he conceded this exemption to Canada. See Jeremy
Kinsman, Negotiating with an Elephant: NAFTA’s not for Sissies, Policy Magazine 35–38 (Sept.–Oct.
2017).
9 NAFTA Annex I, Mexico, reads as: ‘Thirty percent of the screen time of every theatre, assessed on an
annual basis, may be reserved for films produced by Mexican persons either within or outside the
territory of Mexico.’ http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/NAFTA/anx1amex.asp. Note that Mexico’s
commitment is not put in strongly legally binding words since it uses the verb ‘may’, not ‘shall’.
10 Rodrigo Gómez Garcia, El impacto del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) en la
industria audiovisual mexicana, Tesis doctoral 261 (Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona
2006).
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progressive reduction of the screen quota. From a starting level of 30% in
December 1993, it was lowered to 10% in December 2017, with a zero quota
by 1 January 2018.11 In other words, Mexico’s NAFTA commitment helped to
buttress the first step in the liberalization of Mexican law.12
In sharp contrast, the Korea-US Film Agreement has been a crucial ingredient
in the success of the Korean film industry. It was negotiated at the request of the
US and was completed in two steps in 1985 and 1988. As a result, the Korean
import quota was abolished and after 1988 the US studios were able to establish
their own distribution subsidiaries in Korea. All of this forced the domestic film
companies to abandon their rent-seeking behaviour.13 This change pushed the
Korean film companies, who were vertically integrated, to overhaul their strategy.
One of their first efforts was to invest in Hollywood productions in order for them
to be able to exclusively distribute these partially self-funded films in Korea. While
most of these investments failed, the Korean film companies still learned a great
deal about the American way of producing and distributing films, and were able to
become more globalized and competitive.14
Indeed, the impact of the US film agreements on the development of the
Korean film industry was dramatic. During the decade preceding the agreements,
the Korean film industry released around ninety films per year with an average
revenue of KRW0.9 billion per film (roughly USD0.8 million at the current
exchange rate). From 1989 to 2005, around seventy-five films per year were
released with an average revenue of KRW2.7 billion per film (roughly USD2.4
million at the current exchange rate).15 This huge increase in the average revenue
reveals how the quality improved significantly.
11 Ley Federal de Cinematografia, Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 29 de diciembre
de 1992. Texto vigente. Última reforma publicada DOF 28-04-2010. (Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2010),
http://www.imcine.gob.mx/si tes/536bfc0fa137610966000002/content_entry537f86
d693e05abc55000278/53d19eb09d7279bf03004ffb/files/1.pdf.
12 The NAFTA provision on screen quotas is often accused of being responsible for the current low
production of the Mexican film industry. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this argument
in depth. However, two points should be noted. On the one hand, the low Mexican film production
capacity predates NAFTA and is largely due to inefficient state-ownership of the Mexican film
industry until 1979. Afterwards, privatizations weakened the industrial links between producers and
distributors, contrary to the Korean case. On the other hand, a NAFTA provision (s. 1108.I(c)) sets
that any unilateral post-NAFTA liberalization should be sooner or later bound under NAFTA (the so-
called ‘ratchet’ clause). In other words, the zero screen quota is likely to become part of the NAFTA
renegotiation process. On this specific point, see Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA),
Request for Comments on Negotiating Objectives Regarding Modernization of the North American Free Trade
Agreement with Canada and Mexico (Washington: Motion Picture Association of America 12 June 2017),
https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/MPAA-filing.pdf.
13 Before the abolishment of the import quota, Korean companies generated earnings from importing
and distributing successful foreign films. They were not interested in investing in Korean films or
enhancing the quality of them. See Parc (2017), supra n. 3.
14 For a detailed analysis, see Parc (2017), supra n. 3.
15 Figures in Korean Won are expressed in constant Won at 2010 prices.
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Lastly, as a result of the 2006 Korea-US FTA negotiations, the Korean screen
quota was cut by half, from a minimum of 146 days to 73 days per year. As in the
case of Mexico, this commitment could be seen as possessing little economic value
from a pure negotiation perspective in terms of market access. This is because since
the early 2000s, Korean film companies have been successful enough not to require
the screen quota – although the perception among the public and film-makers was
that it was needed. While the admissions for Korean films plunged between 2007
and 2009, the Korean film industry adjusted its business structure during this time
and has re-emerged as globally more competitive with a healthy domestic
environment.16 However, as in the case of Mexico, this cut had from a trade
law perspective the intrinsic value to ‘bind’ the level of the Korean quota.
4 TODAY’S CENTRALITY OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT
Financial support is usually introduced as a transitory cushion for the domestic film
industry when regulatory barriers have been lowered or eliminated. This was the
case in France and the UK (through the 1950s and the early 1960s, respectively),
Mexico (after the 1992 Federal Law) and Korea (since the 2007s).17 It has
progressively become a permanent feature of film policies, and today it is by far
the dominant instrument across the world. A key reason for this evolution is that,
contrary to regulatory barriers, financial support can be less discriminatory since all
sectors in the film industry – film-makers, distributors, movie theatres, etc. – can
have access to funds if domestic regulations allow it, as often is the case.
4.1 THE RISE OF MASSIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT
Financial support mainly consists of two different types: subsidies stricto sensu which
are direct transfers, mostly from public budgets, and tax relief schemes which are
comprised of tax waivers, credits, grants, or cash rebates. This section focuses on
France, the UK, and the US who all provide the largest amount of support in the
world. Korea is also covered for comparison sake. These countries provide all the
16 For a detailed analysis of this plunge, see Parc (2017), supra n. 3.
17 The Korean government began to grant film subsidies in the mid-1990s, but this was due to the
realization of the economic potential of film industry. After 2007, due to screen quota cut as a result of
Korea-US FTA, the Korean government increased considerably the amount of subsidies. For France
and Korea, see Patrick Messerlin & Jimmyn Parc, The Real Impact of Subsidies on the Film Industry
(1970s-Present): Lessons from France and Korea, 90(1) Pac. Aff. 51–75 (2017); For Mexico, see Jorge
Mario Martínez Piva, Ramón Padilla Pérez, Claudia Schatan Pérez & Verónica Vega Montoya, The
Mexican Film Industry and Its Participation in the Global Value Chain, Estudios y Perspectivas, No. 122,
ECLAC Subregional Headquarters in Mexico, Mexico, D.F. (Oct. 2011), http://archivo.cepal.org/
pdfs/2011/S20111039.pdf.
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various forms of support with the aim to develop a lively domestic film industry in
terms of numbers of admissions and films produced. As was done for the previous
analysis on regulatory barriers, this section explores the key limits faced by each
type of support.
In Table 2, Korea, France, and the UK illustrate three cases of subsidies.
Compared with these countries, Korea runs by far the smallest subsidy scheme. It is
noteworthy that Korea has set up an investment film fund involving public authorities
and private operators (column 8) as well as provides subsidies (column 1).18 France
runs mainly two kinds of subsidies; one is granted to the French film industry stricto
sensu (column 2) while the other is granted to French TV channels for producing films
(column 3). The UK grants subsidies under the title of ‘total public sector selective
investment’ to British films through roughly twenty institutions, which includes
various government departments, the National Lottery, Channel 4, and the BBC
among others (column 4).
Table 2 Financial support in the film industry (selected countries, 2005-2016, constant
2010 USD)
Subsidies Tax Relief Investment Funds
Korea France UK France UK US Korea
(1) Film (2) TV(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005 n.a 383.8 111.4 n.a. 36.7 n.a. 123.0 n.a.
2006 34.7 354.0 114.8 221.7 52.1 243.7 239.2 8.3
2007 68.8 352.4 107.7 235.7 63.1 204.8 556.6 9.5
2008 81.7 357.5 117.4 240.4 75.7 171.3 779.0 27.7
2009 77.0 305.3 98.4 248.6 76.3 160.9 757.9 53.5
18 From a legal point of view, funds in column 8 are investments, not subsidies. However, for the sake of
transparency and exhaustivity, Table 2 presents these funds because there is no available information
allowing to check whether these funds abide by market rules or have a notable subsidy dimension – for
instance, by generating rates of return systematically lower than those required by the market. That
said, even if one adds up both subsidies (column 1) and investment funds (column 8), i.e. assumes that
all Korean investment funds are de facto subsidies, Korea has still much less subsidies than other
countries. See Deok-Joo Lee, Jin-Soo Shin & Kyung-Taek Kim. Analytic Hierarchy Process Analysis
on the Economic Effects of the Film Development Fund in Korea. Proceedings of the World Congress on
Engineering and Computer Science vol. II, WCECS (25–27 Oct. 2017). San Francisco, USA; France also
runs a very modest investment fund (SOFICA). Table 2 includes this fund in the French subsidies
because it has a clear subsidy component under the form of income tax rebates for the private
investors.
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Subsidies Tax Relief Investment Funds
Korea France UK France UK US Korea
(1) Film (2) TV(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2010 67.8 311.8 92.2 253.9 75.3 227.9 900.1 90.8
2011 96.5 406.0 101.0 234.7 72.1 313.5 1116.8 126.3
2012 98.5 419.3 94.8 232.1 88.5 312.9 1413.5 163.7
2013 99.4 414.9 104.2 241.6 79.5 320.1 1430.3 93.3
2014 105.9 447.6 92.0 240.0 104.9 347.6 1548.8 128.8
2015 94.5 420.9 86.1 248.6 106.3 422.4 1335.0 107.9
2016 77.6 448.8 105.3 259.2 109.7 475.2 1440.2 48.8
Notes: Korea: Subsidies schemes (General and Special Accounts, Movie Pictures Development
Fund in column 1) and investment scheme (Fund of the Funds in column 8). France: subsidies
granted by the CNC to the film industry (column 2) and to the broadcasting industry as film
producers (column 3) and tax relief schemes for domestic and foreign films (column 5). UK:
subsidies mostly granted to domestic production (column 4) and funds available for tax relief
(column 6). Data on fiscal years have been recalculated on the basis of calendar years. States of
the US: States’ tax reliefs (column 7).
Sources: Korea: Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism. France: Centre National de la
Cinématographie. UK: British Film Institute. US States: Thom (2018).
The UK (column 6), thirty-one states of the US (hereafter US states) alongside
Washington, D.C., Puerto-Rico, and the US Virgin Islands (column 7), as of
January 2018, and to a smaller extent France (column 5) illustrate three cases of tax
relief schemes.19 The UK launched its scheme in the 1990s in order to attract
specifically foreign film-makers – de facto US major studios – to produce (parts of)
their films in the country. In the early 2000s, a growing number of US states
introduced their own tax relief schemes as a way to enjoy the economic benefits of
the film business. Each state has a different, generally wide, coverage of the ‘eligible
expenses’ providing tax relief.20 Most of these schemes do not require a specific
19 The first state in the US to adopt such a program was Louisiana in 1992. The number of states
involved (but not in terms of funds spent as shown in Table 2) peaked in 2009, with forty-four states,
plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto-Rico running such schemes. See National Conference of State
Legislatures, State film Production Incentives & Programs (30 Jan. 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
fiscal-policy/state-film-production-incentives-and-programs.aspx.
20 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra n. 19. In addition to US states’ tax relief schemes,
there are various forms of support from the US Federal Government to the film industry. This support,
mostly based on ss 181 and 199 of the Internal Revenue Code, is mostly granted under the form of tax
deductions to the owners of the film. As these very complex provisions have been disrupted and
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nationality in order to be eligible, but the major US studios seem again to be de facto
the largest beneficiaries. It is noteworthy that the amount of tax relief provided by a
few US states are as large as the total subsidies granted by some individual EU Member
States. For instance, California has a film credit program of USD330 million since
2015, hence comparable in size to the UK subsidies shown on Table 2.21
Unfortunately, the information on subsidies and tax relief schemes in other
countries is scant. In Europe, the total support of twenty-eight EU Member States
was estimated to be roughly USD2 billion in 1999, which is the latest available
figure.22 The information on tax relief schemes is even scarcer. However, it should
be highlighted that these countries are openly competing in terms of such schemes,
especially with respect to foreign film-makers. For instance, France and Germany
have recently increased the funds that will be available for tax relief schemes to
attract foreign studios: between 2016 and 2018, these funds have risen from
USD60 to 150 million in Germany and from USD 14 to 66 million in France.
Both countries have justified their decisions by the need to match each other’s tax
relief schemes as well as that of the UK.23 But who are the beneficiaries of these
schemes and can tax relief bring about sustainable economic benefits to the host
country or region?
4.2 UNEXPECTED EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIES
Regarding the role of subsidies, the administrating bodies – CNC for France,
KOFIC for Korea, and BFI for the UK – generally seek three desirable goals: (1)
increase the number of domestic films produced; (2) enhance the quality of
domestic films, hence boost admission numbers; and (3) expand the market size
amended numerous times, it is difficult to assess thoroughly their magnitude and impact over time. As
a result, they are not covered by this study.
21 Joshua McCaherty, California Triples Film Tax Credit, Tax Foundation (Washington, D.C.: Tax
Foundation Sept. 2014), https://taxfoundation.org/california-triples-film-tax-credit/. See also http://
film.ca.gov/tax-credit/.
22 Susan Newman-Baudais, Public Funding for Films and Audiovisual Works in Europe, A report by the
European Audiovisual Observatory (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2011).
23 Françoise Laborde, Avis sur le projet de loi de finances 2018, Tome IV, Fascicule 3, Médias, livre et
industries culturelles: livre et industries culturelles, Sénat, République Française, Session ordinaire de
2017–2018, No. 112. (2018): 109, http://www.senat.fr/rap/a17-112-43/a17-112-430.html; Udo
Bomnüter, State Aid for Film in Germany: Analyzing Institutions and Discussing Efficacy, in Handbook of
State Aid for Film: Finance, Industries and Regulation, (Paul Murschetz, Roland Teichmann & Matthias
Karmasin eds, Springer International Publishing 2018), DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-71716-6; Diana
Lodderhose, Germany to Court Hollywood with New $80M Film Fund (Deadline|Hollywood 2017),
http://deadline.com/2017/03/german-courting-hollywood-with-new-big-budget-film-fund-dfff2-
1202042923/. It is noteworthy that, ten years before the same argument was used in the UK for
justifying an increase in British film support; see House of Lords, Communications Committee, The British
Film and Television Industries, First Report, Session 2009–2010 (London: House of Lords 14 Jan. 2010)
Ch. 2, Recital 60, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldcomuni/37/3706.htm.
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by increasing the number of total admissions for both foreign and domestic films in
order to ensure a more lively film culture in the country.24 When the target of
subsidies is well defined and implemented with sound goals, trade policy analysis
suggests that they can play a positive role for promoting the domestic film
industry.25 However, in practice this is rarely the case and subsidies can quickly
bring about unintended negative effects on the film industry.
Indeed, a thorough comparison of the French and Korean film industries over
the last four decades does not support a correlation between the amount of
subsidies and the goals achieved.26 In fact, the Korean film industry has achieved
all three goals with fewer subsidies than the French industry. While these results
may be unexpected for many policy-makers, they are not very surprising. This is
because, in the real world, subsidies inevitably inflate the costs of producing,
marketing, and/or distributing films. The allocation of costs should ideally be
‘optimized’ by production companies based on market considerations. However,
subsidies allow them to buy or hire inputs above the cost of what might have
initially been planned. The film industry is particularly sensitive to such cost
inflation because it crucially relies on a few specific inputs – directors, script-
writers, lead actors and producers.27 Because they are unique yet essential, specific
inputs have the capacity to inflate costs in every economic activity. Those in the
film industry are particularly able to do so due to their influence on the media and
their strong political clout.
This reality suggests the following two propositions. First, the larger the
film subsidies, the higher the risks of inefficiencies associated with cost inflation.
Interestingly, this first proposition is consistent with the fact that French films
have not performed better than Korean films. Although the French and Korean
24 See Centre National de la Cinématographie et de l’Image Animée (CNC), Tout ce que vous avez toujours
voulu savoir sur le CNC … sans jamais oser le demander (Paris: CNC May 2013); It is important to stress
that the third goal suffers from an intrinsic methodological bias since more subsidies should be
expected to generate more films, but that does not necessarily mean to attract a larger audience.
25 Lack of space prevents a more detailed discussion in this article on the arguments justifying the use of
subsidies. A theoretical survey can be found in: W. M. Corden, The Normative Theory of International
Trade, in Handbook of International Economics vol. I (Ronald W. Jones & Peter B. Kenen eds,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers 1984). A presentation in the context of
policy-making in the audiovisual sector can be found in: Steven Globerman, The Entertainment
Industries, Government Policies, and Canada’s National Identity (Vancouver, Fraser Institute 2014),
http://www.fraserinstitute.org.
26 Some have argued that the large number of films produced in France justifies subsidies. However, with
much less subsidies, Korea has produced an increasing number of films which is today roughly
equivalent to the French number; see Messerlin & Parc, supra n. 17.
27 The notion of specific inputs finds its source in one of the oldest economic analyses, the so-called
‘Ricardian rent’, which examines the distribution of the value added produced by an economic
activity among ‘specific’ and ‘mobile’ inputs. Mobile inputs (for instance, those related to travel
expenses, facilities, and daily expenses required by film production) are different from specific inputs
to the extent that they are easily available and provided by competitive markets. As a result, mobile
inputs have more difficulties to be paid in excess of what they receive usually.
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domestic film markets are almost the same size, approximately USD1.5 billion
in 2016, Table 2 shows that Korea’s subsidies are less than 30% of the total
French subsidies. The risks of cost inflation are thus likely to be much higher in
France than in Korea.28 Second, the wider and more complex a subsidy
scheme, the higher the risk that different types of subsidies will be on a
collision course. For instance, in sharp contrast with the Korean scheme
which, in the 1990s, focused on infrastructure for the use of any domestic
film company, the French scheme grants substantial subsidies to movie theatres
in addition to film-makers. It turns out that subsidies to help improve the
equipment used in movie theatres provide a significant advantage to US films
which feature more 3D and 4D technologies than French films. It is also
noteworthy to consider the fact that US films take advantage of these upgraded
facilities funded by the French taxpayer and that the beneficiaries of these
subsidies are private movie theaters.29
4.3 TAX RELIEF SCHEMES IN QUESTION
So far, most of the existing studies assessing tax relief schemes are based on
accounting methods estimating the increases in terms of jobs or value added
generated by the schemes.30 They generally find net benefits – more jobs or value
added than in the absence of support. However, this approach is not satisfactory
because it misses the crucial question on the best use of public funds, in other
words their opportunity cost. Would the equivalent amount of money allocated
28 Measuring the inflation of the costs generated by subsidies is difficult because this inflation is
channelled via a myriad of practices, such as artificially inflating the provisional accounts presented
when applying for the subsidies, or presenting actors or actresses’ costs as fees paid for ‘image rights’. E.
g. the fees paid for ‘image rights’ have increased by 119% in France in the early 2000s. However, the
Cour des Comptes notes macro-economic evidence pointing to this direction, such as the fact that the
median and average costs of French films produced between 2002 and 2012 have increased by 5%
which is more than the rate of inflation. Alternative measures relying on individual cases may provide a
more limited but better idea of the magnitude of cost inflation. A well-known French film producer
reports that the fees of French performers range from 500,000 to 2 million euros when they perform in
French films, whereas they range from 50,000 to 200,000 euros when the same actors perform in
foreign films; see Cour des Comptes, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique et audiovisuelle: des
changements nécessaires, Rapport thématique public 75–78 (Paris, Cour des Comptes Apr. 2014);
Vincent Maraval, Les acteurs français sont trop payés!, Le Monde (28 Décembre 2012) http://www.
lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2012/12/28/les-acteurs-francais-sont-trop-payes_1811151_3208.html.
29 See Messerlin & Parc, supra n. 17.
30 For the UK, see Oxford Economics, The Economic Impact of the UK Film Industry, Supported by the
British Film Institute, Pinewood Shepperton plc, British Film Commission and Creative England
(London: Oxford Economics 2012); For the US, see MNP LPP, Economic and Social Impacts of the
Florida Film and Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive Program, Preliminary Report Prepared for the
Motion Picture Association of America (Mar. 2013), https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/Economic-and-Social-Impacts-of-the-Florida-Film-and-Entertainment-Industry-Financial-
Incentive-Program.pdf.
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to a tax relief scheme for the film industry generate more sustainable quality jobs
and/or value added than if it was used for other purposes in the industry? Cost-
benefit analyses regarding this question have found the costs to be larger than the
benefits.31 An alternative method for assessing the impact of tax relief schemes
uses econometric methods testing the relations between the goal(s) officially
targeted, such as jobs or value added, and the magnitude of tax relief schemes.
As of today, these studies have not found a statistically significant relationship
between job creation and increasing (or decreasing) tax relief schemes.32
That said, tax relief schemes have two substantial downsides which differ
depending on the goals they seek to achieve. First, when attracting foreign film-
makers for comparative advantages such as landscape or technical skills in a
country, the danger is that the country may give ‘excessively’ generous offers.
For instance, the existing studies on the current UK tax relief schemes suggest that
it ensures production costs in the UK are roughly 30% lower than those in Los
Angeles, and 5 to 15% lower than those in other countries such as Australia or
Canada.33 Such enormous cost differentials raise serious questions on the robust-
ness for the justification of these schemes.
Second, tax relief schemes create a serious problem of sustainability. Some
may highlight the benefits of the spill-over effects which could be obtained
through working with foreign film-makers. They argue that these benefits can
improve the comparative and competitive disadvantages of the host countries
through tax relief. However, one should pay attention to the fact that foreign
film-makers would come to a country to benefit from strong local advantages, not
to improve local disadvantages. In other words, within the limited time of film
production, foreign film-makers have incentives to bring in their own workers
rather than train local workers who often lack the necessary skills, hence few
opportunities to create spill-over effects. More importantly, tax relief schemes for
foreign film-makers tend to discriminate against the domestic film-makers of the
host country.
31 See David Zin, Film Incentives in Michigan, Issue Paper (Lansing, Michigan: Senate Fiscal Agency 2010),
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Issues/FilmIncentives/FilmIncentives.pdf; New
England Public Policy Center, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Connecticut’s Film Tax Credit (Boston: Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston 19 Jan. 2009), https://www.google.fr/search?ie=UTF-8&q=Cost-benefit
+ana lys i s+of+Connect icut%E2%80%99s+f i lm+tax+credi t&gws_rd=cr&dcr=0&ei=
RIa3WviZE5DOwQLZsKnYDw.
32 See Michael Thom, Lights, Camera, but No Action? Tax and Economic Development. Lessons from State
Motion Picture Incentive Programs, Am. Rev. Pub. Administration (2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/metrics/10.1177/0275074016651958; Michael Thom & Brian An, Fade to Black? Exploring Policy
Enactment and Termination Through the Rise and Fall of State Tax Incentives for the Motion Picture Industry,
45(1) Am. Pol. Res. 85–108 (2017).
33 See Olsberg|SPI, A Comparison of the Production Costs of Feature Films Shot in Ten Locations Around the
World, A Report for the Office of the British Film Commissioner (London: UK Film Council Sept.
2008). Oxford Economics, supra n. 30.
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5 THE ROLE OF TRADE AGREEMENTS REGARDING FINANCIAL
SUPPORT
Can trade agreements contribute to a more effective use of film subsidies?
Disciplines on subsidies in trade agreements are notoriously weak. Multilateral
disciplines, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) countervailing
measures, can be used relatively easily to protect the domestic markets of
the importing countries rather than to induce exporting countries to limit
their subsidies. Bilateral disciplines on subsidies are also very difficult to
implement, as illustrated by NAFTA. The film industry raises an additional
problem – to define which subsidies are acceptable (‘non-actionable’ in trade
parlance) and which ones are not acceptable (‘actionable’). Integrating
such cultural concerns in WTO disciplines on subsidies could be based on
a ‘reference paper’ specifying the main criteria for subsidies in the film
industry deemed to satisfy cultural concerns, but as yet such a paper does
not exist.34
That said, the film industry offers a case example where trade agreements
could indeed contribute to a more effective use of subsidies. This could be
achieved by designing provisions on ‘international coproduction’ which would
grant ‘national treatment’ to coproduced films per se and/or a wider set of film
makers who coproduce films from the two signatories. These provisions would
deal with the various aspects of the film production process in order for copro-
duced films to be treated as domestic films in the two countries. The Protocol on
cultural cooperation in the Korea-EU FTA and Annex 7-B on audiovisual copro-
duction in the Australia-Korea FTA illustrate to some extent what could be
pursued in these provisions.
If well-designed and enforced, coproduction provisions on national treat-
ment would be like two kills with one shot. First, they would contribute towards
easing the movements of capital and labour which are the most restrictive
measures as shown by the STRI. However, if FTA Protocols or Annexes
could contribute to this objective, they are unlikely to do so alone because
regulations in the film industry are often very detailed. A pragmatic solution
would thus consist of inviting designated regulators from the two partner coun-
tries to complement the work of trade negotiators. More precisely, regulators
would be asked to assess the ‘equivalence’ of the regulations of the two countries
in the film sector – that is, to decide whether, if different, a partner’s regulation
34 Emmanuel Cocq & Patrick Messerlin, French Audio-Visual Policy: Impact and Compatibility with Trade
Negotiations, in Cultural Diversity and International Economic Integration: The Global Governance of the
Audio-Visual Sector (Paulo Guerrieri, Lelio Iapadre & Georg Koopmann eds, Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar 2005).
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could be considered as ‘equivalent’ in its effects to the corresponding regulation
of the country at stake.35
Second, if shared by enough countries, these provisions could reduce the risks
of ‘subsidy races’. Such trends are currently occurring among a number of coun-
tries around the world. However, they also happen within each country itself. For
instance, providing more attractive tax relief schemes for foreign film-makers
induces their domestic counterparts to lobby the government to receive the
same conditions for their own tax relief scheme. These international and domestic
subsidy races reinforce each other. They increase the whole public support avail-
able to film industries around the world, hence amplify the related cost inflation.
6 KOREA AS A BENCH MARKER
Among the nine countries selected in this study, Korea is one of the least protected
countries in terms of regulatory barriers and measures, and runs the smallest subsidy
program, with a small tax relief scheme. In addition, the Korean film industry has
been able to rely on trade agreements for reducing entrenched regulatory barriers
although in recent years there has been some hesitation, notably in the case of
subsidies.
Korea was initially not sure about the positive consequences of its trade
agreements. Abolishment of the import quota in the late 1980s was only extracted
under the threat of a US 301 action, and the screen quota cut in 2006 was imposed
by the US as a non-negotiable precondition for getting an FTA which was in
favour of Korea’s manufacturing sectors. In both cases, the opposition of the
Korean film industry and the public at large was extremely strong. However, as
argued above, both large and small Korean film companies have recognized the
opportunities presented by globalization and competition. In short, the key to the
success of the Korean film industry has been a process of benchmarking, learning,
and then innovating among non-subsidized private companies alongside less inter-
ventionist public policies over the last two decades.36
The best indicator of this success is to compare the evolution of admissions for
domestic films over the past few decades in Korea and in the seven largest film
markets. It is preferable to measure this evolution in number of admissions rather
35 For more details, see Patrick Messerlin, Negotiating Mega-Agreements: Lessons from the EU, European
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme,
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/112 (Florence, Italy: European University Institute 2014); see also
Bernard Hoekman & Charles Sabel, Trade Agreements, Regulatory Sovereignty and Democratic Legitimacy,
European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance
Programme, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2017/36 (Florence, Italy: European University Institute
2017).
36 See Parc (2017), supra n. 3.
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than in terms of market share because examining solely market share would offer a
distorted view – it treats 5% of 100 as similar to 5% of 1,000. Figure 1 provides
three key points on the number of admissions: (1) in the 1990s, Korea was trailing
far behind other countries; (2) during the late 1990s and early 2000s there is the
take-off of the Korean film industry, ten years after the Korea-US Film
Agreements; and (3) since the mid-2000s, the Korean market for domestic films
overtakes those of the other countries, despite a weak performance in 2007 and
2008. This blip was caused by a fall in private investments due to fears about the
future of the film industry following the screen quota cut.37
Figure 1 Admissions for domestic films (selected countries, 1980-2016)
Sources: CNC (European countries and Mexico), KOFIC (Korea), MPPA (Japan). Authors’ calculations.
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Note: For getting a better sense of the trends, the curves illustrate two-year averages
of admissions.
It is important to stress two more points from a cultural perspective. First, the
market share of Korean films has increased from 35.1% in 2000 to 53.7% in 2016,
contrasting with what has happened in the other selected countries, except Japan.
However, some may point out that Korean films are currently not performing so
well with a market share of 53.7% in 2016 compared to 63.8% in 2013. This
statement misses that among the selected nine countries, only the US, Japan, and
37 Ibid.
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Korea enjoy a market share larger than 50%.38 It also ignores the fact that Korean
films have faced competition from a larger number of foreign films in 2016 than
compared to 2013.39
Second, between the 1980s and the 1990s, Korea had the lowest annual
number of admissions per inhabitant among the nine selected countries. In 2016,
it had the highest annual number of admissions per inhabitant, with 4.2 admissions
per inhabitant; that of France is 3.2 which is the highest in Europe.40 Last but not
least, the number of admissions for US films in Korean movie theatres has doubled
between 2000 and 2016 – from roughly 41 to 89 million – whereas they have
declined in the other selected countries, except in Mexico. In short, the success of
Korea’s domestic films has not crowded out foreign films, notably US ones, leaving
a large exposure of the Korean audience – as well as Korean film-makers – to
cultural diversity from around the world. All this shows how large the overall
Korean market size has become through trade agreements rather than relying upon
massive subsidies.
7 CONCLUSION
This study argues that, contrary to widespread belief, sound trade-related policies
can actually be an effective tool towards enhancing film industries. First, it shows
the inability of quotas to protect domestic film-makers. Rather they favour
domestic interests that have little concern for promoting the domestic film indus-
try. Second, it cautions on the dangers of tax relief schemes as they tend to offer
excessive support for attracting foreign producers and present serious problems in
terms of sustainability. Lastly, regarding subsidies, this study argues they should be
kept at a reasonable size and be focused on consistent and clear objectives.
This article also shows that, if well designed, trade agreements can eliminate or
reduce deeply entrenched economic distortions in domestic markets which are
harmful to national culture. Moreover, they can develop in a pragmatic way
‘national treatment’ provisions that could substantially reduce barriers on the
international movements of capital and labour – by far, the most important source
of regulatory restrictions today in the film industry – as well as reduce or eliminate
the discriminatory, hence distortionary impact of subsidy schemes. As a result,
38 Statistics Korea, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxMainPrint.do?idx_cd=
2444&board_cd=INDX_001.
39 In 2013, 183 Korean films and 722 foreign films have been released in Korea. In 2016, the respective
figures are 302 and 1,218; see Korean Film Council, State of the Korean Film Industry for 2016 (Seoul,
Korea: Korean Film Council 2016).
40 Screen Australia, Number of Feature Films Produced and Key Cinema Data, 2008–2016, https://www.
screenaustralia.gov.au/fact-finders/international-context/world-rankings/feature-films-and-cinemas.
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trade agreements can contribute towards establishing a healthier environment for
domestic film industries.
This study suggests two interesting areas for further research. First, the film
industries are currently faced with digitization from on-demand audiovisual
media services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime. In this regard, several coun-
tries, such as some EU Member States, have turned back to old and inefficient
trade policies, including quotas. However, a preliminary review of the above
results incorporating the new digital service providers suggests that the main
findings of this article remain valid.41 More broadly, from a policy perspective,
the traditional film studios and the new digital service providers are in a stage of
forming a new industrial structure. However, it happens that these two entities
benefit from a very different tax treatment – a point often made. They also have a
very different subsidy treatment – a point documented in this article but very
rarely stressed. As a result, effective film policies in the future should thus be
designed on a ‘net tax-cum-subsidy’ basis – a major effort to be done by
governments.
The second interesting point comes from the fact that, so far, the question of
subsidies has been examined from the angle of those who grant subsidies – govern-
ments. This article suggests to look also from the other side of the equation: the
beneficiaries of subsidies – that is, from the film companies to the ‘specific’ inputs,
such as directors, screenwriters, producers, and actors.
In this respect, the current trade and culture debate seems out of touch
with reality. On the one hand, it insists on the primacy of ‘national culture’,
overlooking the main lesson from history – the extent to which national
cultures have learnt from each other over centuries by imitation and innova-
tion. On the other hand, it largely ignores the fact that today the US film
industry is benefitting from massive subsidies all over the world, including from
governments which claim to be fighting for cultural exemption, exception, or
diversity. This situation induces certain governments to adopt awkward poli-
cies – for instance to impose new taxes on firms while asking them to invest
these ‘taxes’ in the production of films with ‘local content’. History provides
many illustrations of foreign artists having made more positive contributions to
a country’s culture than the local counterparts. However, these cases were
dependent on the instinct and energy of enlightened ‘patrons’, hence not so
easily applicable to ‘heartless’ institutions.
41 Patrick Messerlin, Turning the Single Digital Market into a House of Cards? The European Local Content
Quota on Netflix (ECIPE, June 2016), http://ecipe.org/publications/turning-the-single-digital-mar
ket-into-a-house-of-cards-the-european-local-content-quota-on-netflix/.
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